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We examine the dynamics of extreme values of overnight borrowing rates in an inter-bank
money market before a ﬁnancial crisis during which overnight borrowing rates rocketed up to
(simple annual) 4000 percent. It is shown that the generalized Pareto distribution ﬁts well to
the extreme values of the interest rate distribution. We also provide predictions of extreme
overnight borrowing rates using pre-crisis data. The examination of tails (extreme values)
provides answers to such issues as to what are the extreme movements to be expected in
ﬁnancial markets; is there a possibility for even larger movements and, are there theoretical
processes that can model the type of fat-tails in the observed data? The answers to such
questions are essential for proper management of ﬁnancial exposures and laying ground for
regulations.
r 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: G0; G1; C1
Keywords: Financial crises; Risk management; Extreme value theory; Overnight rate; Federal funds rate;
Turkish economysee front matter r 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
.euroecorev.2004.10.010
nding author.
dresses: gencay@sfu.ca (R. Genc-ay), faruk@bilkent.edu.tr (F. Selc-uk).
p://www.sfu.ca/rgencay, http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/faruk.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
R. Genc-ay, F. Selc-uk / European Economic Review 50 (2006) 547–5635481. Introduction
The Turkish government began implementing a far reaching restructuring and
reform program after the general elections in April 1999. The aim of the program
was to reduce inﬂation from its 60–70 percent level per year to single digits by the
end of the year 2002. The program gained further momentum after the country made
a stand-by arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in December
1999 and announced the technical aspects of the disinﬂation program. The main tool
of the disinﬂation program was the adoption of a tablita with an exit, that is, the
percent change in the value of the Turkish Lira (TRL) against a basket of foreign
currencies was ﬁxed beginning January 2000. Meanwhile, the stand-by arrangement
determined a ceiling for the net domestic assets of the Central Bank. Accordingly,
the Central Bank was able to create TRL liquidity only through net foreign capital
inﬂows. The structure of the stabilization program implied that the interest rate
would be market determined in line with the exchange rate depreciation and capital
ﬂows, and the volatility of interest rates would be higher than the volatility before
the program. A close inspection of Fig. 1 reveals that this was the case.
It was well-known by the market participants that one of the commercial banks
(Demirbank) had an extremely risky position during the year 2000. The bank (with a1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
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Fig. 1. Daily average overnight interest rates in Turkey (annualized simple) including the February 2001
crisis. The daily rates are weighted average of intraday rates. The sample period is from January 2, 1990 to
February 23, 2001 with 2806 observations. Source: Central Bank of Turkey.
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government securities portfolio mostly from the money market with very short-term
obligations. On Monday, November 20, 2000, Demirbank was not able to borrow
from the money market and the Central Bank stepped in to cover Demirbank’s
position. In the following days, market makers in the government securities market
stopped posting prices and Demirbank was not able to liquidate its positions. As a
result, overnight interest rates started to increase and there was a rapid capital
outﬂow, starting on Wednesday, November 22.
The heavy capital outﬂow and continuous decrease in the Central Bank reserves
caused further liquidity pressure in the market. The Central Bank started to provide
liquidity by violating the rule set by the stand-by agreement. However, the injected
liquidity bounced back to the Central Bank in the form of additional demand for
foreign currency. Therefore, the Central Bank stopped providing liquidity on
Thursday, November 30, 2000. Immediately, the overnight interest rate reached its
peak at (simple annual) 873 percent on Friday, December 1, 2000. The IMF rushed
in an ‘‘emergency team’’ to discuss an emergency loan. On Tuesday, December 5,
Turkish authorities announced a USD 7.5 billion rescue package with the IMF. The
following morning before the markets opened, Demirbank became the 11th Turkish
bank to be taken under control of the Saving Deposits Insurance Fund.
After the IMF’s backing of the country in December 2000, the Central Bank
reserves returned to its pre-crisis level. Interest rates decreased, albeit stabilizing at a
higher level than the pre-crisis average. Nevertheless, there were concerns about the
Treasury’s ability to borrow from the domestic market at favorable terms. A
scheduled domestic debt auction of the Treasury on February 20, 2001, the day
before the maturing USD 7 billion domestic debt, was aimed at borrowing
approximately USD 5 billion (around 10 percent of the total domestic debt).
Suddenly, the day before the auction, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stormed
out of a key meeting of top political and military leaders stating that a ‘‘dispute’’ had
arisen between himself and the country’s president. The news hit the market and the
stock market plunged 18 percent in 1 day. The same day, the Central Bank sold USD
7.5 billion (approximately one-third of the total ofﬁcial reserves) and refused to
provide TRL liquidity to the system. The daily average overnight interest rates shot
up to (simple annual) 2000 percent on February 20, and 4000 percent on February
21. The government responded by dropping its exchange-rate control and the TRL/
USD exchange rate went up 40 percent in 1 week.
The Turkish ﬁnancial crisis in February 2001 is a case study for extreme risks and
risk management practices. In recent years, the problem of extreme risks in ﬁnancial
markets has become topical following the crises in the Asian and Russian markets,
and the unexpected big losses of investment banks such as Barings and Daiwa. The
value-at-risk (VaR) measures with Gaussian-type innovations failed to cope with
these turmoils mainly because the evaluation of extreme risks in the Gaussian model
is directly related to the variance. However, the underlying distribution may not even
have a ﬁnite variance.
We investigate the dynamics of the extreme values of overnight borrowing rates in
the inter-bank money market for the TRL before the ﬁnancial crisis of February 2001.
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ﬁnancial fragility. Estimated parameters imply that the Turkish interest rates have
unbounded support and the interest rates may come from a distribution with inﬁnite
variance. We also provide estimates of overnight borrowing rates at 0.999 percentile (1
day in every 4 years) on pre-crisis data. The results indicate that every 4 years one can
expect to see a day with overnight interest rates as high as 1000 percent (simple annual)
in Turkey. In other words, the extraordinary levels observed during the February 2001
crisis were in the nature of the economy before they actually materialized.
We also show that such extraordinary levels are a statistical impossibility for the
United States. Estimated parameters of the daily US Effective Federal Funds Rate
distribution imply that the distribution of US interest rates has a bounded support
and all moments exist. As a result, estimated interest rates even at the 0.9999th
quantile (1 day in every 10,000 days, approximately 30 years) for the US are less than
the historical high of 22.4 percent. We postulate that the difference between the US
and Turkey stems from the fact that the two countries have a different degree of
development of the ﬁnancial markets and institutions.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the methodological framework is
introduced. Section 3 reports the descriptive statistics and estimation results for the
Turkish and the US overnight interest rates. We conclude afterwards.2. Extreme value theory
Extreme value theory is a powerful and fairly robust framework to study the tail
behavior of a distribution. Embrechts et al. (1997) is a comprehensive source of the
EVT for the ﬁnance and insurance literature. Reiss and Thomas (1997) and Beirlant
et al. (1996) also provide extensive coverage.1 In the following section, we present the
parametric framework for our study.
2.1. Fisher– Tippett theorem
The theorem of Fisher and Tippett (1928) is the core of the EVT. The theory deals
with the convergence of maxima. Suppose that X 1;X 2; . . . ;Xn is a sequence of
independently and identically distributed random variables from an unknown
distribution function F ðxÞ: Denote the maximum of the ﬁrst mon observations of X
by Mm ¼ maxðX 1;X 2; . . . ;XnÞ: Given a sequence of am40 and bm such that ðMm 
bmÞ=am; the sequence of normalized maxima converges in distribution to the
following so-called Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distribution:
HxðxÞ ¼
eð1þxxÞ
1=x
if xa0;
ee
x
if x ¼ 0;
(
(1)1There have been a limited number of extreme value studies in ﬁnance literature. See Danielsson and de
Vries (1997), Embrechts (2000) and Genc-ay and Selc-uk (2004) and references therein for EVT applications
in ﬁnance.
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distribution is known as the Fre´chet distribution and it has a fat-tail. The larger the
shape parameter, the more fat-tailed the distribution. If xo0; the distribution is
known as the Weibull distribution. Finally, if x ¼ 0; it is the Gumbel distribution.2
In general, we are not only interested in the maxima of observations, but also in
the behavior of large observations which exceed a high threshold. Given a high
threshold u, the distribution of excess values of X over threshold u is deﬁned by
FuðyÞ ¼ PfX  upyjX4ug ¼
F ðyþ uÞ  F ðuÞ
1 F ðuÞ (2)
which represents the probability that the value of X exceeds the threshold u by at
most an amount yX0 given that X exceeds over the threshold u. A theorem by
Balkema and de Haan (1974) and Pickands (1975) shows that for a sufﬁciently high
threshold u, the distribution function of the excess can be approximated by the
generalized Pareto distribution (GPD), i.e., the excess distribution FuðyÞ converges to
the GPD below as the threshold gets large:
Gx;bðxÞ ¼
1 1þ x x
b
 1=x
if xa0;
1 ex=b if x ¼ 0;
8><>: (3)
where x is the shape parameter. The GPD embeds a number of other distributions.
When x40; it takes the form of the ordinary Pareto distribution and E½Xk is inﬁnite
for kX1=x: For the security returns or high frequency foreign exchange returns, the
estimates of x are usually less than 0.5, implying that the returns have ﬁnite variance.
See, for instance, Longin (1996) and Dacorogna et al. (2001).
The importance of the Balkema and de Haan (1974) and Pickands (1975) results is
that the distribution of excesses may be approximated by the GPD by estimating x
and b as a function of a high threshold u. The parameters of the GPD can be
estimated with various methods such as the method of probability weighted
moments or the maximum likelihood method. For x4 0:5 which corresponds to
heavy-tails, Hosking and Wallis (1987) presents evidence that maximum likelihood
regularity conditions are fulﬁlled and the maximum likelihood estimates are
asymptotically normally distributed. Therefore, the approximate standard errors
for the estimators of b and x can be obtained through maximum likelihood
estimation. Notice that even if the identical and independent distribution condition
fails, the EVT may still be an accurate approximation of the actual distribution
function of maxima (Reiss and Thomas, 1997, pp. 10 and 172). If there is
dependency in the data, the estimation result should be modiﬁed with an estimated
extremal index. In this case, the quantile estimate would be different than the one
estimated with weak dependency or independency assumption. We refer the reader
to Longin (2000), Embrechts et al. (1997, Chapter 8) and Reiss and Thomas (1997,2Extensive coverage can be found in Gumbel (1958).
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in practice.
2.2. The tail estimation
Since FuðyÞ in Eq. (2) converges to the GPD for sufﬁciently large u, we have the
following representation:
F ðxÞ  ½1 F ðuÞGx;b;uðx uÞ þ F ðuÞ, (4)
where x ¼ yþ u and yX0: The last term on the right-hand side can be determined by
the empirical estimator ðnNuÞ=n where Nu is the number of exceedances of u and n
is the sample size. The tail estimator, therefore, is given by
dFðxÞ ¼ 1Nu
n
1þ x^ x u
b^
 !1=x^
. (5)
For a given probability level q, a percentile ðx^qÞ at the tail is estimated by inverting
the tail estimator in (5),
x^q ¼ uþ
b^
x^
n
Nu
ð1 qÞ
 x^
 1
 !
. (6)
In statistics, this is the quantile estimation and it can be utilized in VaR estimations
in ﬁnance applications.
2.3. Preliminary data analysis
In statistics, a QQ-plot (quantile–quantile plot) is a convenient visual tool to
examine whether a sample comes from a speciﬁc distribution. Speciﬁcally, the
quantiles of a hypothesized distribution are plotted against the quantiles of an
empirical distribution. If the sample comes from the hypothesized distribution, the
QQ-plot is linear. In EVT and its applications, the QQ-plot is typically plotted
against the Gumbel distribution, i.e., a distribution with a thin-sized tail. If the data
come from a distribution in the maximum domain of attraction of the Gumbel, the
points on the graph would lie along a positively sloped straight line. If there is a
concave presence, this would indicate a fat-tailed distribution, whereas a convex
departure is an indication of short-tailed distribution.
A second tool is the sample mean excess function (MEF) which is the sum of
the excesses over the threshold u divided by the number of data points which
exceed the threshold u. It is an estimate of the MEF which describes the expected
overshoot of a threshold once an exceedance occurs. If the empirical MEF is a
positively sloped straight line above a certain threshold u, it is an indication that the
data follows the GPD with a positive shape parameter x: On the other hand, if the
data comes from a distribution which is in the maximum domain of attraction of the
Gumbel, one would observe a horizontal MEF while short-tailed data would result
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the (simple annual) overnight interest rates before and after the February 2001
crisis
n Mean Std. Ku. Sk. Med. Min. Max. Low High
Pre-crisis 2801 73.0 49.4 82.62 7.5 67.7 13.6 873.1 34.0 107.7
Full sample 2806 75.7 99.6 943.2 26.4 67.7 13.6 4018.6 34.4 109.6
n: Sample size; Mean: Sample mean; Std: Standard deviation; Ku: Kurtosis; Sk: Skewness; Min: Minimum
observed rate; Max: Maximum observed rate; Low: Rate corresponding to the 5th percentile; High: Rate
corresponding to the 95th percentile. The full sample period is from January 2, 1990 to February 23, 2001
with 2806 observations. Pre-crisis period excludes the last ﬁve business days. Source: Central Bank of
Turkey. Overnight interest rates are daily weighted average of inter-bank interest rates as calculated by the
Central Bank of Turkey
R. Genc-ay, F. Selc-uk / European Economic Review 50 (2006) 547–563 553in a negative slope. See Reiss and Thomas (1997, Chapter 2) and Embrechts et al.
(1997, Chapter 6) for these and other diagnostic tools and exploratory data analysis
for extremes.3. Empirical results
The data source for the daily overnight interest rates (simple annual) is the
Central Bank of Turkey. The daily rates are calculated by the Central Bank as a
weighted average of intraday transactions in the inter-bank money market.3 The
descriptive statistics of daily average simple annual overnight interest rates before
and after the February 2001 crisis are given in Table 1. The full sample period is
January 2, 1990–February 23, 2001 with 2806 observations. It includes all
available daily interest rate data from the inter-bank money market in Turkey. In
this paper, all calculations and predictions are carried out with simple annual interest
rates.
In Table 1, the sample means of 73.0 and 75.7 percent correspond to compound
annual interest rates of approximately 107 and 113 percent, respectively. Although it
is high by the standards of a developed market, it reﬂects the high inﬂation levels and
associated risk in the economy. The annual average percent increase in consumer
prices (inﬂation) during the sample period was 75.4 percent, implying an average
annual real interest rate of 18–21 percent. Both kurtosis and skewness estimates
show that the interest rates are far from being normally distributed. The estimated
kurtosis 82.62 before the crisis shows that the interest rate distribution has a fat-tail.
The estimated skewness of 7.5 before the crisis points out that the distribution is
skewed. After the crisis, both skewness (26.4) and kurtosis (943.2) estimates indicate
that fat-tailness and skewness of the distribution have substantially increased.3The observed maximum intraday interest rate is (simple annual) 6200 percent. This means borrowing
TRL at an interest rate of 17.2 percent for 1 day ð17:2 360  6200Þ: We use weighted average of intraday
rates as provided by the Central Bank.
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It is necessary to determine a threshold interest rate to estimate the parameters of
the GPD. As presented in Section 2.4, the QQ-plot and the MEF are two empirical
tools for this task. In a QQ-plot, the quantiles of the empirical distribution function
on the x-axis are plotted against the quantiles of the Gumbel distribution function
on the y-axis. The points should lie approximately along a straight line if the data is
from the assumed Gumbel distribution. Since the Gumbel distribution has a
medium-sized tail, a concave relationship between the quantiles of the empirical and
the Gumbel distributions indicate a heavy-tailed distribution for the time series
under study. The top panel of Fig. 2 indicates that the sample points start deviating
from linear behavior at around 80 percent and form a concave pattern.
The sample MEF is another diagnostic tool used to determine a threshold. If the
points of the MEF exhibit an upward trend, this indicates heavy-tailed behavior.
Short-tailed data exhibit negatively sloped behavior whereas an exponential
distribution has a ﬂat MEF. The bottom panel of Fig. 2 demonstrates that the
sample MEF is approximately linear and positively sloped after the 80 percent
interest rate threshold. The examination of both panels in Fig. 2 indicate that the
approximate threshold value corresponds to 80 percent.
For a given threshold level, a tail estimation involves the estimation of the
parameters of the GPD. The maximum likelihood estimation is a convenient way to
obtain standard errors of the parameter estimates.4 For the threshold u ¼ 80; the
threshold exceedances are 389 data points which constitute the upper 13.9 percent
tail of the original sample of 2801 sample points. Notice that an 80 percent overnight
interest rate (simple annual) is equivalent to an annualized compound interest rate of
122 percent. During the sample period, the average annual percent increase in TRL/
USD exchange rate is 75 percent. Therefore, the threshold implies a 23 percent
annualized dollar interest rate.
The maximum likelihood estimates of x and b at threshold u ¼ 80 are (standard
errors are in parenthesis) 0.73 (0.086) and 22 (2.03), respectively. The estimated
parameters are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. As discussed in Section
2.1, when x40; the distribution is known as the Fre´chet distribution and it has a fat-
tail with tail index 1=x: The larger the shape parameter, the more fat-tailed the
distribution. The value of x^ ¼ 0:73 indicates that the overnight interest rate series
may come from a distribution with inﬁnite variance.
The estimated GPD model with a threshold of 80 percent interest rate (u ¼ 80)
before the February 2001 crisis is presented in the top panel of Fig. 3. The estimated
model is plotted in a solid curve while the interest rates above the threshold are
shown in circles (on logarithmic scale). The estimated model successfully captures4EVIM (Extreme Value Analysis in Matlab, Genc-ay et al. (2001)) is a comprehensive toolbox for EVT
analysis. This toolbox is available at http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/faruk. EVIS (Extreme Values in S-Plus)
is another free suit of S-Plus functions for EVT analysis. The package may be obtained from http://
www.math.ethz.ch/mcneil. We used both packages in our calculations and estimations.
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Fig. 2. Top: QQ-plot of daily overnight interest rates (simple annual) before the February 2001 crisis
against the Gumble distribution. The quantiles of the empirical distribution function on the x-axis are
plotted against the quantiles of the Gumbel distribution function on the y-axis. The points should lie along
the straight line if the data is from the assumed Gumbel distribution. A concave presence indicates a fat-
tailed distribution. Source: Central Bank of Turkey. Bottom: Sample mean excesses of daily overnight
interest rates (simple annual) before the February 2001 crisis over increasing thresholds. A straight line
with positive slope above a given threshold u is a sign of the GPD in tail. Notice that the plot is
approximately linear and positively sloped after 80 percent, indicating the Pareto behavior in the tail.
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Fig. 3. Top: The estimated GPD model for the excess interest rates before the February 2001 crisis. The
estimated model is plotted as a curve while the actual daily overnight interest rates (simple annual) above
the threshold are shown in circles (in logarithmic scale). The threshold is 80 percent interest rate, u ¼ 80:
The estimated parameters are x ¼ 0:73 and b^ ¼ 22: The number of exceedances is 389. The sample period
is from January 2, 1990 to February 16, 2001 which ends 1 week before the February 2001 crisis. Bottom:
Estimates of shape parameter, x; at different thresholds (upper x-axis) or alternatively with different
number of exceedances (lower x-axis) before the February 2001 crisis. The parameter estimates are from
100 GPD models with thresholds ranging between 80 percent and 100 percent interest rates (simple
annual). The sample period is from January 2, 1990 to February 16, 2001. The sample period ends at the
week before the February 2001 crisis.
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successfully approximated by a Fre´chet-type distribution.
To examine the robustness of the results to the choice of the threshold value, the
maximum likelihood estimation of the shape parameter, x; is carried out for GPD
models with a range of thresholds between 80 and 100 percent. The estimates of x; as
well as their asymptotic conﬁdence intervals, are reported in the bottom panel of Fig.
3. On the lower x-axis the number of data points exceeding the threshold is plotted
and on the upper x-axis the threshold is located. The estimates of the shape
parameter, x; are plotted on the y-axis. The results indicate that the shape parameter
is fairly stable within the range of 80–90 percent interest rate. Of course, there are
fewer observations at higher thresholds and less statistical precision. This is reﬂected
in the wider conﬁdence intervals.3.2. Point predictions at the tails
It is possible to estimate a percentile value at the tail from the estimated
parameters of the GPD. In Fig. 4, the tail estimates are reported with the pre-
February 2001 crisis data. Since EVT is used to calculate unconditional probabilities,
we do not predict the timing of the crisis but report that certain extreme interest rate
levels are expected to happen every so often.
On a log–log plot as in Fig. 4, GPD becomes linear with negative ð1=xÞ slope and it
is easier to interpret results visually. In this ﬁgure, the left y-axis indicates the tail
probabilities, 1 F ðxÞ: The vertical dotted line starting from the x-axis is the
estimated overnight interest rate which corresponds to the 1 percent tail probability
on the y-axis. This value is obtained from the intersection of the 1 percent tail
probability with the estimated tail and traced down to the x-axis. Therefore, the 99
percent quantile (1 day in every 100 days) interest rate corresponds to 257 percent.
The dotted curve is the conﬁdence interval calculated by the proﬁle likelihood
method.5 The 95 percent conﬁdence level corresponds to the intersection of the
horizontal dotted line starting from the right y-axis. The range of the 95 percent
conﬁdence interval is 221 percent for the lower end and 313 percent for the higher end.
Fig. 4 has a straightforward message. When the interest rate corresponding to the
99 percent quantile (1 day in every 100 days) is evaluated at the 95 percent conﬁdence
level, the maximum simple annual interest rate would go as high as 313 percent. This
is a substantially high overnight interest rate but it is not in the order of ten
thousands or millions percent compound interest rate as it was observed during the
February crisis. Let us now go further in the tail to evaluate further extreme
possibilities and investigate the 99.9 percent quantile estimate (1 day in every 4
years). This is presented in Fig. 5 where the interest rate estimates at the 99.9 percent
quantile (1 day in every 4 years) are plotted as a function of the threshold (upper
x-axis) or alternatively as a function of exceedances (lower x-axis) with the5The usual Wald standard errors are computed from the inversion of the Hessian of the log-likelihood
function. Conﬁdence limits from the inversion of the likelihood ratio statistic are called proﬁle likelihood
conﬁdence limits.
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Fig. 4. Tail estimate for the excess interest rates before the February 2001 crisis. The left y-axis indicates
the tail probabilities 1 F ðxÞ: The vertical dotted line from x-axis is the estimated interest rate (at 257
percent) and intersects with the 1 percent tail probability on the left y-axis. Therefore, it is the estimated
interest rate at the 99 percent quantile. The dotted curve is the conﬁdence interval around this estimate,
calculated by the proﬁle likelihood method. It intersects with the 95 percent horizontal conﬁdence line
from the right y-axis and the corresponding 95 percent conﬁdence interval is ð221; 313Þ in percent. Notice
that the conﬁdence interval becomes larger when the conﬁdence level is increased (a down movement in the
level of conﬁdence on the right y-axis). The sample period is from January 2, 1990 to February 16, 2001
which ends 1 week before the February 2001 crisis.
R. Genc-ay, F. Selc-uk / European Economic Review 50 (2006) 547–563558pre-February crisis data. The estimated interest rate settles above 1000 percent
(simple annual) for most thresholds although variations are higher at higher
thresholds. The upper conﬁdence interval indicates that before the crisis, every 4
years one could expect to see a day with an overnight interest rate as high as 4800
percent.
The results show that overnight interest rates observed during the ﬁnancial crisis
were in the nature of the economy before they materialized. The policy makers and
the ﬁnancial authorities in Turkey, along with the Turkish commercial banks, simply
ignored the possibility that such extreme tail events might occur.
3.3. A comparison with the US overnight interest rates
Although the Turkish daily overnight rate is an excellent case study with high
volatility and a thick-tailed distribution, this data set has not been studied widely in
the literature and is not well-known. Hence, we have repeated the extreme value
analysis with the daily US Effective Federal Funds Rate as a comparison. The
Federal Funds Rate (FFR) is the interest rate that banks with excess reserves at a
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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Fig. 5. Interest rate estimates of quantile 0.999 as a function of the threshold (upper x-axis) or
alternatively as a function of exceedances (lower x-axis) before the February crisis. These estimates are
from 100 GPD models with thresholds ranging between 80 percent and 100 percent interest rates (simple
annual). The estimated interest rate at 0.999 quantile settles above 1000 percent at most thresholds
although variations are higher at the higher thresholds. The Wald conﬁdence intervals indicate that
interest rates as high as 4000 percent is a possibility. The sample period is from January 2, 1990 to
February 16, 2001 which ends 1 week before the February 2001 crisis.
R. Genc-ay, F. Selc-uk / European Economic Review 50 (2006) 547–563 559Federal Reserve District Bank charge other banks that need overnight loans. The
sample period is from July 1, 1954 to December 31, 2000. The sample size is 16,986
daily observations. The data source is the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.6
In Fig. 6 (bottom, left), the quantiles of the empirical distribution function of the
daily US Effective Federal Funds Rate on the x-axis are plotted against the quantiles
of the Gumbel distribution function on the y-axis. The convex relationship between
the quantiles of the empirical and the Gumbel distributions indicate a thin-tailed
distribution for the US interest rates. The GPD estimations with different numbers
of exceedances in this data set indicate that the estimated shape parameter x^ is6We do not intend to model the FFR dynamics in the US: It is far beyond the scope of this study. There
is ongoing discussion as to whether interest rates are stationary or not. Conventional economic and ﬁnance
theory often assumes that interest rates are stationary and utilize a model which is a mean-reverting
process. However, some empirical studies provide evidence that interest rates are nonstationary processes.
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Fig. 6. Top: Effective Federal Funds Rate (daily) estimates of 0.9999th (top, left) and 0.999 (top, right)
quantiles as a function of exceedances. The estimated interest rate even at 0.9999 quantile (1 day in every
30 years) is less than the historical high of 22.36 percent (July 22, 1981). Bottom left: QQ-plot of Effective
Federal Funds Rate (daily, simple annual) against the Gumbel distribution. The points should lie along
the straight line if the data are from a Gumbel distribution. A convex presence indicates a thin-tailed
distribution. Bottom right: Estimates of shape parameter, x; at different thresholds (upper x-axis) or
alternatively with different number of exceedances (lower x-axis) for the US. The parameter estimates are
from 100 GPD models with thresholds ranging between 13 percent and 18 percent interest rates (simple
annual). The sample period is from July 1, 1954 to December 31, 2000. Data source: Federal Reserve
Board of Governors, H.15 Release.
R. Genc-ay, F. Selc-uk / European Economic Review 50 (2006) 547–563560remarkably stable around 0:40 (see Fig. 6). This implies that the maximum daily
US Effective Federal Funds Rate distribution has a bounded support and all
moments exist. As a result, the extraordinary overnight rates observed in Turkey are
a statistical impossibility for the United states. Indeed, Fig. 6 plots estimated interest
rates at the 0.9999th quantile (1 day in every 10,000 days, approximately 30 years),
and at the 0.999th quantile (1 day in every 1000 days, approximately 3 years) as a
function of the number of exceedances. The estimated interest rate is very stable
around 20.5 percent at the 0.1 percent tail and at around 22 percent at the 0.01
percent tail regardless of the number of exceedances. Moving in the tail of the
distribution from the 0.1 percent to the 0.01 percent region increases the estimated
interest rate by only around 150 bases points (1.5 percentage point). Notice that it is
not the observed maximum that would determine the possible extreme values at
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interest rates converge. Clearly, the maximum interest rates in Turkey converge to a
distribution which may not even exhibit a ﬁnite variance while the maximum interest
rates in the U.S. has bounded support.7
We postulate that the difference between the U.S. and Turkey stems from the fact
that the two countries have a different degree of development of the ﬁnancial
markets and institutions. First, ﬁnancial markets in Turkey are very shallow and the
ﬁnancial structure is very weak. Total assets of all commercial banks in Turkey
(around USD 150 billion) are comparable to the assets of a medium size
international bank. Second, the Turkish economy has a long history of high
inﬂation with accommodative monetary policies conducted by the Central Bank
which has been under the strong inﬂuence of the government. The FED, on the other
hand, may be considered as a truly independent monetary authority. It is reasonable
to expect that the distributional characteristics of interest rates in Turkey are
changing in view of the fact that Turkey now has an independent central bank and
the ﬁnancial markets are developing very fast.4. Lessons from the Turkish crises and conclusions
Financial crises in emerging markets in general and the Turkish crises in
November 2000 and February 2001 in particular, provide several lessons for
investors both in developing and developed countries. Since a signiﬁcant portion of
total savings in developed economies are invested in emerging markets by hedge
funds, mutual funds and other institutions in the form of portfolio investment, the
costs of ﬁnancial crises are not conﬁned to the residents of emerging market
countries. Therefore, a careful investigation of the market dynamics and the causes
of crises in these economies would beneﬁt investors at large by increasing the
investor awareness.
Fundamental macroeconomic indicators such as growth rate, current account
balance, real exchange rate, budget deﬁcit, export–import ratio and debt–income
ratio are the main sources for assessing the current and future status of an economy.
Therefore, they play a signiﬁcant role in the decision making process of the IMF,
credit rating agencies and multinational fund managers. One of the lessons from the
Turkish crisis is that even if there is no deterioration in fundamental indicators, the
balance sheet issues in the ﬁnancial sector may create an environment in which even
a small shock can lead to a total collapse of the system. In particular, a balance sheet
mismatch situation (funding long-term illiquid assets with short-term obligations)
combined with slack supervision and regulation is an invitation for a liquidity and
currency crisis.
Among others, Eichengreen (2001) investigates both the Argentinian and Turkish
crises in detail. He points to the vulnerability of the banking sector as the main7Given estimated values x^ ¼ 0:40 and b^ ¼ 3:75 with a threshold interest rate 13.5 percent, the estimated
endpoint of the maximum interest rate distribution in the US is 22.67 percent.
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R. Genc-ay, F. Selc-uk / European Economic Review 50 (2006) 547–563562source of crisis in Turkey. Although it was expected that the lira was going to
appreciate during the program, the government could not commit to an upfront
devaluation as the Turkish banks and the private sector had large unhedged foreign
exchange exposures. It was hoped by the program designers that the banking sector
would strengthen before the economy would move into a ﬂoating exchange rate
regime. As Eichengreen (2001) points out, this strategy created a moral hazard in the
system and an incentive to strengthen both balance sheets and supervision
diminished.8 As a result, short foreign exchange positions of the banks doubled
during the initial phase of the program. The direct consequence of this was that the
fear of destabilizing the economy forced the authorities to resist any correction in the
exchange rate, even if it meant extraordinary increases in overnight interest rates.
Given the government’s strong commitment to exchange rates, the relevant question
from the investors’ point of view was ‘‘what extraordinary interest rates may be
observed under extreme situations?’’. Our estimation results from the pre-crisis data
indicate that every 4 years one could expect to see a day with overnight interest rates
over 1000 percent (simple annual). In other words, the extraordinary levels observed
during the crisis were in the nature of the economy before they actually materialized.
The developments during and after the crisis indicate that both policy designers and
the ﬁnancial sector failed to take this characteristic of the economy into account.
Another important implication of our results for risk management is that the
degree of development of the ﬁnancial markets and institutions in different countries
implies different levels of risk and associated risk premium. Therefore, risk managers
should abstain from applying the same risk model and the same value-at-risk
methodology to different economies. A statistical impossibility for a developed
economy might easily be ‘‘1 day in every 100 days’’ in an emerging market.Acknowledgements
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